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1. THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN FOCUS
The fundamental importance of the constitution as the legal norm, at the summit of the law 
sources hierarchy is highlighted by István Bibó’s authoritative thoughts: “ […] The 
community order which regulates human relations is to a certain extent, usually a large 
extent, open to debate, to the game of powers, to change, and to the amendment of 
regulation; certain, usually a smaller number, but more important rules are unchangeable, 
they are to be respected by all and stand above rivalries, party politics and debate. Within 
the domestic legal order, these rules are usually collectively called the constitution or the 
fundamental law and although, as a result of political considerations or the work of pedantic 
lawyers much that could safely be changed is included in these so-called constitutions, 
while others that indeed require stability are left out.”1 An immense tension is palpable 
within the sentence with the contrast between stability and change. The title of the paper 
suggests that this collection of interviews unpacks this conflict of values and it is our 
(Hungarian) Fundamental law being balanced on the scales.
This paper presents disparate opinions of well-known constitutional lawyers who share 
common views on certain issues, but who, by approaching topics from completely different 
perspectives, reach varied conclusions. The heterogeneity of opinions suggest varied world 
views. In some cases, the contradictory answers are confusing, especially with respect to 
the questions which seem to have only one possible answer. This wide range of perspectives 
reflects the magnificence of the (legal) sciences and is an evidence of dynamism and 
progress that ensures the constant grind of scientific research’s gears. This volume provides 
an effective introduction and explanation to each of these viewpoints and the reader may 
choose to identify with any of these views.
2. COMMENDING THE INTERVIEWS:  
“CANDID AND HONEST ANSWERS TO INVESTIGATIVE QUESTIONS”
The direct and fluid style of the interviews, which are a characteristic of this genre, lead and 
assist the reader in understanding the more complex constitutional law problems and their 
context. The distinct viewpoints and arguments clear the way for the identification of the 
Fundamental Law’s virtues and weaknesses. There is, of course, tension. It is hardly 
possible to answer “sine ira et studio” questions that are often embedded in starkly adverse 
1 Bibó (1990) 304. (Translation by the author.)
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(daily) political “ideals”. The common denominator remains the legal sciences mindset, 
which is characterized by, among others, pure logic, the pursuit of coherence and the 
ostracism of inconsistency. 
The authors do not blanket their cautionary critiques but also emphasize constructive 
solutions and support their views with professional-scientific arguments. 
The anthology includes interviews with professionally acclaimed constitutional 
lawyers starting with László Sólyom, former President of Hungary and former President of 
the Constitutional Court; István Kukorelli, former Member of the Constitutional Court, 
University Lecturer and Head of the Department of Constitutional law at ELTE ÁJK; László 
Trócsányi, former Member of the Constitutional Court and former Ambassador to France; 
Herbert Küpper, Country Referent for the Institute of East European Law in Regensburg 
and Honorary Professor of Andrássy University Budapest; András Jakab, Director of the 
Institute for Legal Studies of the HAS Centre for Social Sciences and finally András Patyi, 
Rector of the National University of Public Service and President of the National Election 
Commission and Péter Tölgyesi, former Member of Parliament and political analyst.
This book has undertaken a task no smaller than to shed light on topics that have been 
heatedly discussed in Hungarian (political) public life, both before and after the adoption of 
the Fundamental Law but which had not clearly and unambiguously appeared before the 
audience concerned. These themes are of importance to all citizens and the wider public 
opinion of the European Union and the world.
These topics include Does the Fundamental Law express a common will and is it 
founded on the broad consensus of the entire public? Can this consensus be supplanted by 
reference to the election results or the answers provided to the Government during the 
National Consultation? To what degree was publicity realized during the constitution-
making process? Does Hungary adhere to democratic criteria? What are the advantages and 
dangers of a 2/3 majority in parliament? Is a uni- or bicameral parliament the “better” 
solution in this legislative system? What is the role of the National Avowal, does it bear any 
legal relevance? What might be the long-term consequences of curtailing the Constitutional 
Court’s competencies? To what degree should we consider the Venice Commission’s critical 
opinion? Is the constitutional and political culture of Hungary strong or weak? Do we have 
reason to be hopeful for our future? There are many more important topics of constitutional 
law that are touched upon in these discussions. The interviewees provided honest and 
candid answers to questions about the contemporary constitutional and political landscape.
3. GETTING LOST IN THE DETAILS AND FINDING A WAY OUT
The review’s author sought answers to questions regarding the transparency of the 
constitution-making process; the degree that the constitution authors relied on constitutional 
lawyers’ experiences and advice; how much time remained for substantive consultation 
with representatives of social subsystems, non-governmental organizations and whether the 
need for broad public consensus regarding the Fundamental Law as a universal societal 
norm was realized during the drafting phase. These questions are closely linked, and will 
therefore be considered together.
The definition according to which „the constitution is a foundational law expressing a 
broad public consensus”2 may be taken as a point of departure. In relation to this we should 
2 Kukorelli (2007) 29. (Translation by the author.)
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highlight the end, to which constitutional lawyers axiomatically aspire, according to which 
the purpose of a constitution (or its making) is a “product” founded on overarching public 
consensus. László Sólyom states this idea in the following way: “The constitution holds the 
basic operational norms of society and the state, therefore these question require a broad 
consensus, which should appear during the drafting phase”3. Discussions, debate4 and a 
public clash of ideas are prerequisites of this consensus. However, the drafting procedure in 
2011, according to the views of professionals expressed in academic publications, was not 
characterized by broad political agreements or the pursuit of a consensus. Naturally several 
factors posed an obstacle to the realization of a consensus, which is a prerequisite of an 
“ideal constitution-making procedure”5. These factors will be discussed they appear as 
topics in the volume. 
3.1. Transparent Solutions? – Clash of Ideas
The answers presented in the volume regarding transparent solutions paint a remarkably 
heterogeneous picture. According to László Sólyom, “the current constitution-making 
process was done in secret and the public will it expresses is much weaker than its 
predecessor’s”6. András Jakab is more cautious, he identifies the basis of doubts regarding 
the Fundamental Law in the incomplete transparency and unilateral government support7 of 
the preparatory process.8 In this regard, one of the interview subjects, Péter Tölgyessy, held 
a prophetic-esq professional opinion (before the constitution-making process), that if any 
party won the parliamentary elections with a two-third majority would not pass up the 
opportunity of replacing the provisional constitution with a new foundational law. In this 
case, Tölgyessy writes that the unilateral attempt at constitution-making could hardly result 
in a constitution accepted by the entirety of the political community.9
The diversity of opinions within this volume is well reflected with László Trócsányi 
emphasizing a different view. He highlights the role of several professional conferences and 
the role of the Constitution Drafting Commission in addressing the public at large and the 
national consultation10.11 The constitution drafters also provide a different interpretation of 
the preparatory process, when they speak of a “completely public debate” on certain topics, 
or of the “unprecedented openness of the entire process”.12 The difficulties to see clearly 
with such diversity within a domestic framework requires an external perspective .
    3 Molnár et al. (2013) 18. Others also emphasize the constitution’s overarching nature. See 
Jakab (2011c) 164; Kukorelli (2007) 32; Küpper (2012) 35. On the reasons for broad social dialogue 
see also Szegvári (2009) 431.
    4 Jakab (2011b) 16 states a thought provoking opinion on the role and importance (as well as 
the lack) of ’public debate” in constitution-making .
    5 with respect to the deifinition see Kukorelli (1995) 39.
    6 Molnár et al. (2013) 19.
    7 László Sólyom speaks of one party constition-making, see Molnár et al. (2013) 19. The 
opposition’s lack of participation is highlighted by Herbert Küpper, see Molnár et al. (2013) 90. Péter 
Tölgyessy takes it as an objective fact that the new Fundamental Law is ”solely Viktor Orbán’s 
constitution”. See Molnár et al. (2013) 180. Compare with Küpper (2012) 35. 
    8 Molnár et al. (2013) 112.
    9 Tölgyessy (2009) 42. Compare with Majtényi (2009) 188.
10 For an opposite interpretation of the national consultations’ function see Küpper (2012) 33.
11 Molnár et al. (2013) 72.
12 Ablonczy (2011) 34.
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The Hungarian constitution-making process generated never before seen interest 
internationally as well. The Venice Commission, rather tellingly, emphasized the criteria 
of a democratic constitution-making process including “transparency”, “openness”, 
“inclusiveness” and an “adequate timeframe and conditions allowing pluralism of views 
and proper debate of controversial issues.”13The mere mention of these criteria suggests a 
lack of transparency throughout the constitution-making process.
The duration of the constitution-making process was slightly over one month14 in 
which time the proposed legislation was submitted, adopted and published, then – in my 
opinion – this time frame excluded possibility and realization of the confrontation of 
opinions and (public) debate. 
3.2. The relationship between time and the lack of professional discourse 
It is easy to demonstrate that public consultation regarding the final wording of the 
constitution15 was only superficial and professional discourse was impossible. 
Before preparations for the constitution-making process had begun, the constitutional 
law profession, with regard to “perpetual constitution-making” based on democratic values 
and public consensus, had warned that “the procedural nature of constitution-making could 
not be secured by adopting a new norm in one swift move, since it is worthwhile to conduct 
broad public discourse […]”16. As a result of “governmental hyperactivity”17, including 
hectic lawmaking18, this type of perpetual constitution-making was not realized. Much 
criticism was fired from all political sides at the rapid law-making process, which included 
the new constitution. In general, hyperactivity in the regulatory area resulted in a lack of 
professional consultation and impact studies.19 In this regard, codification also suffered.20 
All this originated from the impossibility of expressing professional opinions, which is 
13 Venice Committee, 2011, point 18. See also Venice Committee, 2011, points 71–73.
14 Hungary’s Fundamental Law draft legislation was submitted on 14 March 2011, adopted on 
18 April 2011 and published on 25 April 2011. It is sufficient to look at the mere facts for a basis of 
the analysis. The volume contains a chronology of the Fundamental Law’s adoption. See Molnár et al. 
(2013) 131.
15 István Kukorelli refers to the fact that more ardent critics to not hold the Salamon materials to 
be a part of the constitution-making process, since they were not cited during the drafting of the final 
wording. See Molnár et al. (2013) 19. László Sólyom holds this view as well. The Constitution 
Drafting Committee’s concept was submitted to parliament on 20 december 2010, but by January it 
”was placed among other materials to be taken under advisement”. (Sólyom (2011) 11. n. 1.)
16 Szegvári (2009) 431. (Translation by the author.)
17 I have adopted the expression from Péter Zárug Farkas. See: Tóth et al. (2012) 211.
18 Several domestic and foreign sources highlighted the record breaking intensity of Hungarian 
law-making. For an example of the multiplication of regulations see Mátyás (2013). On the subject of 
rapidity and law-making „output” see also Küpper (2013) 167.
19 See Sárközy (2012) 310. Tamás Sárközy believes that the adoption of the new Fundamental 
Law was the right step, but ”not as lightning fast law-making, intentionally disregarding the tested 
techniques of codification”. See Sárközy (2012) 311. (Translation by the author.)
Tamás Prugberger reflects on Sárközy’s thoughts and expresses reservations as to the fact that the 
government “eliminated the system substantive negotiations and introduced faction and member 
submission based law-making” to secure unobstructed law-making. See Prugberger (2013) 106. 
(Translation by the author.)
20 See Jakab (2011a) 70.
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closely linked to the time factor. As László Sólyom showed21, circumstances were largely 
determined by the fact that a draft which could have served as the basis of scientific 
discourse between professionals was not readily available. Therefore it is not surprising 
that, as a result of the short time made available to study the draft, an onslaught of 
statements were published in place of substantive professional consultation and dialogue 
with law professors and practicing lawyers.22 The Venice Commission expressed its 
concerns regarding the tight schedule established for the adoption of the constitution and 
pointed out the importance of involving the academic community.23
My view is that, because of the aforementioned reasons, the opportunity of creating an 
“optimal constitution”24 was missed. During the 2011 constitution-making process the 
scales were severely tipped in the favor of policy, to the detriment of professionalism. 
Scientific discourse cannot be constrained by such a strict schedule. It is well known that 
professional debate, the clash of ideas, formation of counterarguments and their synthesis, 
and even “feedback” are a time and labor intensive processes requiring precision. Not to 
mention the fact that Hungary’s Fundamental Law stood at the center of it all. 
4. THE AIM OF THE BOOK: TO INVITE EVERY CITIZEN
It should be emphasized that the interviews may be of interest to professionals and also for 
citizens who may be interested in gaining a wider perspective of the public law system. The 
editors have provided several explanatory notes to aid an in depth understanding. There are 
short and well placed informative paragraphs throughout the interviews which help answer 
readers’ questions on constitutional history such as what is meant by the “Four Yes 
Referendum”; how the 1989 Constitution was born; who the “Midnight Judges” are or what 
really is the Hungarian historical constitution. The editors have taken their guiding role 
seriously as they know that the concepts of constitutional law, which appear in the volume, 
are not readily accessible to all and a legend explaining key concepts can be found at the 
end of the book, which aids in finding the way through a forest of unfamiliar terms. A few 
examples include ex tunc effect, paritarian nomination committees, vote of confidence, 
action popularis, the Easter constitution, cardinal act, political veto and eternity clause. 
Those terms, clear to professionals, become accessible to readers with a general knowledge 
of public law and so the collection of interviews enables everybody who is interested in 
Hungarian public life of which constitutional legal science forms an immanent part.
The editors’ aim, with this volume and the explanatory solutions, is, as stated in the 
Foreword, “to take the citizens for whom the Fundamental law was written seriously”.25 
The significance of the publication of this book requires emphasis because the editors 
have brought a perspective which not only introduces citizens to debates concerning the 
Fundamental Law but also serves to enrich their understanding of democracy. This aids in 
meeting the modern criteria of democracy, as stated by István Bibó “all grown persons have 
21 Sólyom (2011) 11.
22 Küpper (2012) 33; Jakab (2011a) 70.
23 Venice Committee, 2011, points 17, 19, 72.
24 During the birth of an optimal consitution professional theories and the polity itself are 
equally present. See Kukorelli (1995) 43.
25 Molnár et al. (2013) 11.
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the right, responsibility and competence to have and express their opinion regarding the 
most important issues of public life”.26
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